Federal Judge Gives History Lesson on Anti-Gay Discrimination

The federal court ruling striking down Mississippi’s ban on same-sex couples getting married is worth reading for many reasons. Paul wrote earlier about U.S. District Judge Carlton Reeves’s compelling explanation of the role of the courts in protecting Americans’ constitutional rights. The ruling is also filled with rich historical detail about the extent to which the state of Mississippi and the federal government have discriminated against LGBT citizens over the years, as well as the ways in which groups like the Ku Klux Klan and the notorious Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission used anti-gay rhetoric and innuendo in their attacks on African American civil rights leaders and institutions.

This history is an important rebuttal to bogus claims by anti-gay activists that gay people do not need to have their rights protected in law because they have never suffered from discrimination.

Quotes from the opinion, with citations removed for readability:

Any claim that Mississippians quietly accommodated gay and lesbian citizens could no longer be made in the 1960s, when prejudice against homosexuals (and other groups) became more visible during the civil rights movement. Segregationists called their opponents “racial  perverts,” while U.S. Marshals – summoned to enforce civil rights – were labeled “sadists and  perverts.” Klan propaganda tied together “Communists, homosexuals, and Jews, fornicators and liberals and angry blacks – infidels all.”

One Klan photo showed a black man touching the crotch of the white man sitting next to him, attempting to make the link between racial equality and homosexuality explicit.

Civil rights leaders had predicted the attack. In selecting the Freedom Riders, James Farmer had conducted interviews to weed out “Communists, homosexuals, [and] drug addicts.” “We had to screen them very carefully because we knew that if they found anything to throw at us, they would throw it,” he explained.

This reflected society’s notion that homosexuals were “undesirables.” It also placed civil rights leaders in the position of seeking rights for one disenfranchised group while simultaneously seeking to avoid association with another disenfranchised group. Mississippians opposed to integration harassed several civil rights leaders for their homosexuality. Bill Higgs was a prominent gay Mississippi civil rights lawyer. He was targeted for his activism, convicted in absentia of delinquency of a minor, and threatened with “unlimited  jailings” should he ever return to Mississippi.

He never did.

Reeves also discusses the case of Bayard Rustin, the openly gay African American civil rights activist who organized the 1963 March on Washington at which Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered his famous “I Have a Dream” speech.

The most interesting part of Rustin’s story, though – and the reason why he merits more discussion here – is that he was subjected to anti-gay discrimination by both white and black people, majority and minority alike. Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, a black Democrat, threatened to feed the media a false story that Rustin was having an affair with Martin Luther King, Jr., unless Dr. King canceled a protest at the Democratic National Convention.

Other persons within the civil rights movement were similarly “put off by Rustin’s homosexuality.” Roy Wilkins, an NAACP executive, “was particularly nasty to Bayard Rustin – very hostile,” in part because he “was very nervous about Bayard’s homosexuality.” Dr. King eventually had Rustin resign “because of persistent criticism of Rustin’s homosexuality and Communist ties and because of Congressman Adam Clayton Powell’s threat.”

Rustin reemerged years later as one of the principal organizers of the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom. A. Philip Randolph and Dr. King wanted Rustin as the march’s chief organizer, but Wilkins pushed back “because [Rustin] was gay . . . something which in particular would offend J. Edgar Hoover.” The group ultimately “decided Randolph would be in charge of the march, that Rustin would be the principal organizer, but that he would stay somewhat in the background.”

The concern about offending Hoover was prescient, as the FBI Director and other top officials soon moved to use Rustin’s homosexuality against him. In August 1963, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, and President John F. Kennedy urgently reviewed the transcript of a FBI wiretap in which Dr. King acknowledged Rustin’s homosexuality. A day later, Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina “rose in the Senate to denounce Rustin for sexual perversion, vagrancy, and lewdness.” FBI “headquarters badgered the field offices for new details” of Rustin’s sex life for months.

As Reeves makes clear, this kind of persecution was not only reserved for civil rights activists.

Rustin’s story speaks to the long tradition of Americans from all walks of life uniting to discriminate against homosexuals. It did not matter if one was liberal or conservative, segregationist or civil rights leader, Democrat or Republican; homosexuals were “the other.” Being homosexual invited scrutiny and professional consequences.

These consequences befell quite a few Mississippians. Ted Russell, the conductor of the Jackson Symphony Orchestra, lost his job and his Belhaven College faculty position after he was caught in a gay sex sting by the Jackson Police Department. In the early 1980s, Congressman Jon Hinson drew scrutiny for frequenting an X-rated gay movie theater in Washington, D.C., and although he won reelection, he resigned when he returned to Washington and was caught performing gay sex acts in a Capitol Hill bathroom. As early as 1950, the State’s flagship institution of higher learning, the University of Mississippi, “forced three homosexual students and one faculty member to leave the university” because it “did not tolerate homosexuality.” Lesbian instructors at Mississippi University for Women were pushed out of their jobs, while students at other Mississippi public universities were expelled for their homosexuality. A 1979 article on gay Jacksonians said “most” remained closeted because “they fear losing their jobs, friends and families.”

Reeves discusses the anti-gay actions of the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission, which was created in 1956 to maintain racial segregation by any means necessary.

Sovereignty Commission “[i]nvestigators and local officials also targeted local blacks and outsiders involved in civil rights activities as being sexually deviant.” They singled out Rust College, a private historically black institution, on reports that instructors there were “homosexuals and racial agitators.”

Those with power took smaller, yet meaningful, actions to discourage gay organizing and association in Mississippi. The State refused to let gay rights organizations incorporate as nonprofits. The newspaper at Mississippi State University – student-led, with an elected editor – refused to print a gay organization’s advertisement notifying gay and lesbian students of an off-campus “Gay Center” offering “counseling, legal aid and a library of homosexual literature. An advisor to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights concluded that the Jackson Police Department took “a series . . . of maneuvers to harass members of Jackson’s gay community.” “As of 1985 not a single university campus in Mississippi recognized a lesbian and gay student group.”

Reeves’s ruling also makes clear that official discrimination is not only in the state’s past.

In 1990, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed a trial judge who declared that a mother, who was a lesbian, could not visit her children in the presence of her female partner. In Weigand v. Houghton, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed a trial judge who refused residential custody to a father in large part because he was in a long-term relationship with another man. A dissent complained that the father’s sexuality had impaired the court’s judgment, since the child would now have to live with “the unemployed stepfather [who] is a convicted felon, drinker, drug-taker, adulterer, wife-beater, and child-threatener, and . . . the mother [who] has been transitory, works two jobs, and has limited time with the child.”

 In 2002, one of Mississippi’s justice court judges, frustrated with advances in gay rights in California, Vermont, and Hawaii, “opined that homosexuals belong in mental institutions.” Although he was reprimanded and fined by the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance, the Mississippi Supreme Court vacated the sanctions. It was more important for gay citizens to know that their judge was biased and seek his recusal than to “forc[e] judges to conceal their prejudice against gays and lesbians,” it wrote. The “Commission urges us to ‘calm the waters’ when, as the guardians of this state’s judicial system, we should be helping our citizens to spot the crocodiles.”

Reeves details a number of recent complaints and lawsuits challenging discriminatory treatment by state and local governments as well as legal inequities such as the fact that Mississippi law permits a single person to adopt a child but not gay or lesbian couples.

This kind of restriction was once supported by pseudoscience. We now recognize that it actually “harms the children, by telling them they don’t have two parents, like other children, and harms the parent who is not the adoptive parent by depriving him or her of the legal status of a parent.”

Reeves concludes the historical section of the ruling this way:

“The past is never dead. It’s not even past.” That is as true here as anywhere else. Seven centuries of strong objections to homosexual conduct have resulted in a constellation of State laws that treat gay and lesbian Mississippians as lesser, “other” people. Thus, it is easy to conclude that they have suffered through a long and unfortunate history of discrimination.

PFAW Foundation

Mississippi Judge Striking Down Marriage Ban Explains the Role of Courts

Among the many things to be thankful for this Thanksgiving are our fundamental constitutional rights and the principled federal judges who make sure those rights are vindicated, even when popular majorities disagree. Judge Carlton Reeves reminded us of that yesterday in his ruling striking down Mississippi's ban that prevented gays and lesbians from marrying.

Judge Reeves has written a thorough opinion that respectfully considers all the arguments put forth by opponents of marriage equality and carefully explains why the marriage ban, popular as it may be in Mississippi, violates both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. At 72 pages, it is well worth reading if you want to see our Constitution and our federal court system at their best.

Among the many highlights is Judge Reeves's response to those who say the issue of marriage equality should be resolved in the political branches rather than through the courts. This is the position recently taken by the Sixth Circuit in a highly flawed opinion written by Judge Jeffrey Sutton. Judge Reeves explains:

In upholding four states' same-sex marriage bans, [the Sixth Circuit] expressed optimism that voters would change their minds on same-sex marriage, and argued that the courts should give them that opportunity. As that court wrote, "from the claimants' perspective, we have an eleven-year record marked by nearly as many successes as defeats and a widely held assumption that the future holds more promise than the past—if the federal courts will allow that future to take hold." (emphasis added).

The undersigned sees the judicial role differently. The courts do not wait out the political process when constitutional rights are being violated, especially when the political process caused the constitutional violations in the first place. The framers did not set up Article III to yield to "the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority." The Federalist No. 10. By honoring its obligation conferred by Article III [of the Constitution], the court does not diminish the political process. Rather, the court holds fast to the fundamental belief that constitutional principles that safeguard liberty and guarantee equality are not subject to the ballot. [footnote and internal citations removed]

Judge Reeves also provides an important historical context and the role courts have played in fulfilling the promises of our Constitution:

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Although this text has not changed in nearly 150 years, our understanding of it has changed dramatically. Before turning to today's issue, then, it is worth considering some of those historical changes.

He then cites Supreme Court cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to allow racial segregation, the blanket exclusion of women from practicing law, the criminalization of consensual sex between two men in their own home:

These are just a few examples. There are others. Even an abbreviated history shows that millions of Americans were once deemed ineligible for full Fourteenth Amendment protection. But we now take for granted that racial discrimination is wrong, that women cannot be excluded from the professions, and that gay and lesbian citizens are entitled to the same privacy in their sex lives that heterosexual citizens enjoy. We changed. These issues have faded into the background of everyday life.

The judiciary plays a unique role in this process. The above cases were not put to a vote of the American people. The votes had already been counted; the legislatures had already acted. Most voters thought nothing wrong with the status quo, unconstitutional as it may be.

This was always a risk of our representative democracy. James Madison wrote that "measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority." The Federalist No. 10. He and his colleagues "knew times can blind us to certain truths." Lawrence [v. Texas], 539 U.S. at 579. Mistakes would be made.

In their wisdom, though, they created a co-equal branch of government where aggrieved persons could try to show "that the laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress." Id. The judiciary has been charged with hearing these claims for more than two centuries. The will of the majority is usually affirmed. Every now and then, however, the majority has done an injustice to a person's rights, and the case must be resolved in his or her favor.

Judge Reeves, who was nominated to the bench by President Obama, explains well the importance of our nation's federal courts, while also demonstrating how important it is who serves on those courts.

PFAW Foundation

PFAW Activists Protest Kentucky’s Marriage Equality Ban

People For the American Way joined local activists at a park in downtown Louisville on Friday to protest Kentucky's ban on marriage equality for same-sex couples. 

The "Love Will Win" rally came in response to last week's federal appeals court decision that upheld laws against same-sex marriage in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee. Currently the Commonwealth doesn't even have to recognize same-sex marriages performed legally in other states.

Protesters are hopeful this setback will pave the way for a Supreme Court reversal, bringing marriage equality to the South and the rest of the nation.

Chris Hartman, director of the Fairness Campaign, said that he’s disappointed by the decision but pleased by the prospects of getting a case in front of the U.S. Supreme Court.

"I think we all knew the sixth circuit was going to rule against LGBT freedom to marry,” Hartman said. “The sixth circuit is the most overturned circuit at the Supreme Court in the entire nation."

Thus far, 32 states and the District of Columbia have legalized same-sex marriage.

PFAW

The Sixth Circuit's Flawed Marriage Ruling

A divided three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals this afternoon upheld the marriage bans of Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, and Kentucky. The majority opinion was written by Judge Jeffrey Sutton and joined by Deborah Cook, both put on the bench by George W. Bush. Clinton nominee Martha Craig Daughtrey dissented.

Among the many flaws in the majority's reasoning was the conclusion that Equal Protection violations are best resolved in the political sphere:

When the courts do not let the people resolve new social issues like this one, they perpetuate the idea that the heroes in these change events are judges and lawyers. Better in this instance, we think, to allow change through the customary political processes, in which the people, gay and straight alike, become the heroes of their own stories by meeting each other not as adversaries in a court system but as fellow citizens seeking to resolve a new social issue in a fair-minded way.

But this is a case where a discreet group, long a target of discrimination, found itself once again victimized by the majority acting through the democratic process. The Equal Protection Clause exists to protect vulnerable minorities from being victimized by hostile majorities using the "customary political process."

As the dissent states:

The author of the majority opinion has drafted what would make an engrossing TED Talk or, possibly, an introductory lecture in Political Philosophy. But as an appellate court decision, it wholly fails to grapple with the relevant constitutional question in this appeal: whether a state's constitutional prohibition of same-sex marriage violates equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the majority sets up a false premise—that the question before us is "who should decide?"—and leads us through a largely irrelevant discourse on democracy and federalism.

Another flaw was Sutton's dismissal of the possibility that there was animus in the wave of 2004 and 2006 ballot initiatives in which voters put bans into their state constitutions. He wrote that if the constitutional bans had been unusual, that might trigger suspicion of animus. But he found nothing unusual here:

Neither was the decision to place the definition of marriage in a State's constitution unusual, nor did it otherwise convey the kind of malice or unthinking prejudice the Constitution prohibits. Nineteen States did the same thing during that period [between 2004 and 2006]. And if there was one concern animating the initiatives, it was the fear that the courts would seize control over an issue that people of good faith care deeply about. [emphasis added, internal citation removed]

If that had been the motivation, the constitutional amendments would not have banned gays and lesbians from marrying, but would have simply said that the legislature had the authority to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples. That would have removed the court's authority in the matter. In fact, that is exactly how Hawaii amended its constitution in the 1990s (which is how it recently was able to adopt marriage equality without re-amending its constitution).

But the Hawaii model of inequality was not nearly extreme enough for the advocates of the bans devised and aggressively pushed in 2004 and 2006. They went far, far beyond that. They tied the legislatures' hands and ensured that gays and lesbians would forever be prevented from achieving marriage equality through democratic means.

The ordinary voters who voted for the bans surely had numerous motivations. But it seems like magical thinking on Judge Sutton's part to assume that there was no animus motivating the architects and enthusiastic proponents of such an extreme and permanent exclusion of a targeted minority.

The ones fighting most forcefully for the bans a decade ago were the same organizations and people who had spent years opposing every advance in LGBT equality, whether those advances came from the courts, from legislatures, in classrooms, or in popular culture. That history is vital to understanding their motivations ten years ago, just as it is vital in addressing their current claims that LGBT equality violates their religious liberty.

PFAW Foundation

Did a Nevada Federal Judge Let Personal Beliefs Affect His Marriage Ruling?

The federal district court judge whose pre-Windsor decision to uphold Nevada's marriage ban was recently reversed by the Ninth Circuit has now raised serious questions about whether his ruling was inappropriately influenced by his personal beliefs.

Last Tuesday, the Ninth Circuit ordered Judge Robert C. Jones to sign an order ordering Nevada to allow same-sex couples to marry. That's standard procedure when a case is reversed by an appellate court.

What isn't standard procedure is for the lower court judge to refuse.

BuzzFeed has reported that the day after that order was issued, Judge Jones recused himself without explanation and had the case reassigned. Yet he felt no qualm about presiding over the trial stage of the case – and issuing a ruling against the couples in 2012.

Judge Jones should explain why he recused himself as soon as the Ninth Circuit order came down, because it looks really bad. It looks like his personal feelings about gays and lesbians are so strong that he recused himself rather than comply with a direct order of the Ninth Circuit. And if that is the case, then why didn't he recuse himself from the case at the very start? It certainly taints the legitimacy of his initial ruling against gay and lesbian couples.

This raises serious questions about his fitness for the bench. If Judge Jones has some other reason for his recusal, he should state them and restore public confidence in his judgeship.

PFAW Foundation

Marriage Bans Overturned in Idaho and Nevada

Yesterday, a three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled unanimously in favor of equality, striking down same-sex marriage bans in Idaho and Nevada.

Judge Stephen Reinhardt delivered the ruling for the panel, which applied heightened scrutiny because the bans are applied on the basis of sexual orientation, and concluded that the state laws violate the equal protection rights of lesbians and gays who wish to marry. The court took note of the particular harm marriage bans impose on families:

“To allow same-sex couples to adopt children and then to label their families as second-class because the adoptive parents are of the same sex is cruel as well as unconstitutional. Classifying some families, and especially their children, as of lesser value should be repugnant to all those in this nation who profess to believe in ‘family values.’”  

The ruling follows the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the appeals of five states seeking to reverse similar cases in which a lower court ruled state marriage bans unconstitutional. This morning, however, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy temporarily blocked the appeals court ruling and asked for a response from the plaintiffs involved in Idaho’s marriage lawsuit by Thursday at 5 pm. 

PFAW Foundation

Another Nail in the Coffin for Baker v. Nelson

A Supreme Court decision not to take an appeal of a lower court ruling is generally (and correctly) recognized as not being a ruling on the merits by the nation's highest court. But yesterday's determination not to hear several lower court decisions on marriage is arguably an exception. It can be seen as significantly weakening the argument made by anti-equality advocates that a decades-old Supreme Court one-sentence ruling in a case called Baker v. Nelson prevents lower courts from addressing the constitutionality of marriage bans.

Baker was a one-sentence Supreme Court ruling from 1972. A gay couple had challenged Minnesota's ban on same-sex couples getting married, and they had lost in the state supreme court. They appealed, and the Supreme Court responded with a one-sentence order, dismissing the case "for want of a substantial federal question." Although it was just one sentence and done without oral arguments or a written opinion, the summary dismissal was nonetheless a decision on the merits of the constitutional issue. As a result, most of the lower courts that have addressed the same issue four decades later have had to contend with this case.

Especially since the Windsor case striking down DOMA, most judges have agreed that while the Supreme Court itself has not overruled Baker, doctrinal developments since 1972 on Equal Protection generally – and on anti-gay discrimination in particular – have completely undermined it. Normally, the Justices tell lower courts that only the Supreme Court can overrule a Supreme Court precedent. Until that happens, lower courts should consider themselves bound by the precedent, even if the high court has undermined it over the years. But it has also made an exception if the precedent is, like Baker, a summary dismissal. In that case, courts do not have to follow it if subsequent doctrinal developments indicate it is no longer good law. That's what has allowed so many courts to get to the merits of the constitutional challenges to marriage bans.

Yesterday arguably represents another step in Baker's demise. Several landmark rulings over the past twenty years have recognized the fundamental equality, liberty, and dignity of lesbians and gays, making it hard to say that the Court still considers marriage equality lawsuits as not even presenting "a substantial federal question."

A more direct rebuke of Baker occurred when the Supreme Court issued an order accepting certiorari in the Proposition 8 case, which presented the exact same issue as the older case. Even though the Justices ultimately didn't address the merits, it is hard to claim with a straight face that the Supreme Court accepted cert and engaged in spirited oral arguments on an issue where there was no substantial federal question.

Yesterday's dismissal of the marriage cases represents another important stage in the long death of Baker. Three circuit courts concluded they could address the merits of the marriage equality arguments, Baker notwithstanding. Just by considering the issue, they rejected the holding of Baker. And certainly the conclusion they reached – that the United States Constitution prohibits states from banning same-sex couples from marrying – is a direct repudiation of the older case.

The Supreme Court takes it very seriously when a lower court simply disregards its precedents and says they are no longer good law. It's fine for a lower court to distinguish a case from an important previous precedent – that happens all the time. But to say the precedent can now be ignored would be a major challenge to the Supreme Court's authority … if the Justices thought for a minute that the old case was still good law.

But yesterday's decision sends a powerful message about Baker. A majority of Justices voted not to take the cases. If a majority considered Baker good law, we would not likely have seen an official Court action supported by a majority of the Justices choosing not to hear cases where lower courts declared themselves not bound by the precedent.

As additional circuit courts consider challenges to state marriage bans, they should not consider themselves bound by Baker v. Nelson.

PFAW Foundation

Supreme Court Action on Marriage Cases Is No Surprise

The Supreme Court's decision this morning to not hear appeals of any of the pending marriage equality appeals came as a surprise to some. But as PFAW Foundation's Supreme Court 2014-2015 Term Preview explained last month, most of the Justices may have strongly wanted to avoid taking these cases if at all possible:

Conservatives like Scalia and Thomas, who have in case after case shown their hostility to LGBT equality but may be unsure of how Kennedy would vote, might not be willing to risk a Supreme Court precedent that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry. From their perspective, if they can't change the outcome around the country, why make it worse by adding a jurisprudential nightmare from the nation's highest court that would taint American law for decades to come?

For Justices likely to recognize the constitutional right to marriage equality, the calculation might be different. They, too, not knowing Kennedy's position, might not want to risk a 5-4 ruling in the "wrong" direction on a major constitutional and societal issue. But even if they could be certain of being in the majority, they might find advantages to having the Court stay out. Justice Ginsburg, for instance, has suggested publicly that Roe v. Wade went "too far, too fast," provoking a backlash that could otherwise have been avoided. If the legal question of marriage equality is being decided rightly in all the circuit courts, some Justices might rather leave well enough alone. In fact, Justice Ginsburg told a group of law students in mid-September that without a circuit split, she saw "no urgency" for the Court to take up the issue now, although she added that she expects the Court to take it up "sooner or later."

It looks like the "sooner or later" will be when – or if – a circuit court ever rules against same-sex couples seeking to vindicate their right to marry.

The Term Preview also discussed some of the specific legal issues that an eventual Supreme Court ruling could address, beyond the black-or-white question of whether same-sex couples can marry. For now, absent a circuit court ruling upholding a marriage ban and a subsequent decision by the Supreme Court to hear the appeal, these questions will remain unresolved at the national level. But they are important questions:

Exactly which constitutional right do the bans violate? While numerous courts have ruled in favor of same-sex couples, they have been anything but unanimous in their reasoning: Some have suggested that the bans violate the Due Process Clause, because the longstanding, fundamental right to marry includes the right to marry someone of the same sex. Other judges indicate that the bans violate the Equal Protection Clause because they deny the right to marry based on the sex of the people seeking to get married. Still others suggest that the bans violate the Equal Protection Clause because they discriminate against gays and lesbians. While the different legal rationales would all have the same immediate result (marriage equality), they could create very different legal precedents and have very different impacts down the line as lower courts consider other types of discrimination, whether aimed at gays and lesbians, at transgender people, or at others.

A Supreme Court ruling might decide what level of scrutiny the Equal Protection Clause requires for laws that discriminate against gay people, an issue not squarely faced in previous cases. Most government classifications are subject to – and easily pass – "rational basis" scrutiny by the courts: The law is constitutional as long as it's rationally related to some legitimate government interest. (The Court has said that animus against gays and lesbians is not a legitimate purpose, which in the past has let it bypass the question as to whether anti-gay laws warrant more scrutiny from the courts.)

But a few types of laws trigger heightened Equal Protection scrutiny. Sex-based classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny: They must be substantially related to an important government interest. Race-based classifications are generally subject to strict scrutiny, the highest level: They must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. If the Court rules that laws discriminating against lesbians and gays warrant some level of heightened scrutiny, that would have an enormous impact nationwide on all kinds of laws that discriminate against lesbians and gays, not just marriage bans.

The Court's discussion of this issue could also shed light on whether eliminating private discrimination against LGBT people is (in the Court's eyes) a compelling government interest. This could have an enormous impact as courts consider right wing challenges to anti-discrimination laws on the basis of the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act or state-law analogs.

This last point is particularly important, given efforts by the far right to reframe anti-discrimination and women's health laws as attacks on religious liberty. As affiliate People For the American Way Senior Fellow Peter Montgomery wrote earlier today on Right Wing Watch:

[R]edefining "religious liberty" has become the central culture war issue and the primary legal and public relations strategy chosen by conservative evangelicals and their allies in the Catholic hierarchy to resist the advance of LGBT equality and restrict women's access to reproductive care.

This right-wing reframing effort might have been hurt by a strong Supreme Court ruling emphasizing the critical importance of ending discrimination against lesbians and gays.

PFAW Foundation

Let Freedom (and Wedding Bells) Ring

With the far-right Roberts Court, it's usually good news when they choose not to address a case, and that's especially so this morning: The Court announced it will not be hearing the appeals of any of the pending marriage cases.

That means the stays of the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits' pro-equality rulings should be lifted and marriages should soon be allowed in Utah and Oklahoma (10th Circuit), Indiana and Wisconsin (7th Circuit), and Virginia (4th Circuit).

And in the other non-equality states in those three circuits, loving couples can now go to court and cite their circuit's ruling as binding precedent guaranteeing their right to marry. And they should win: Each circuit decision binds district courts and other three-judge appellate panels in the circuit. The only way to avoid the application of three-judge panel’s decision to other states in the circuit would be for there to be a contrary ruling by a panel - called an en banc panel - made up of all of the active appellate judges in that circuit.

Congratulations to the loving couples in those states for whom the Constitution's promise of liberty and equality will no longer be ideals withheld from them. This is a textbook case of the federal courts doing exactly what they were set up to do: vindicating those whose basic legal rights have been violated.

PFAW Foundation

7th Circuit Says Arguments Against Marriage Equality "Cannot Be Taken Seriously"

Today's unanimous panel ruling by the Seventh Circuit striking down Wisconsin and Indiana's marriage bans is a well-written, carefully reasoned take-down of some of the ludicrous arguments that equality opponents have been making to defend their policy of discrimination. It was written by Richard Posner, a noted conservative put on the bench by Ronald Reagan, and joined by judges nominated by Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. Ruling on the basis of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court summarizes its opinion nicely:

Our pair of cases is rich in detail but ultimately straightforward to decide. The challenged laws discriminate against a minority defined by an immutable characteristic, and the only rationale that the states put forth with any conviction—that same-sex couples and their children don't need marriage because same-sex couples can't produce children, intended or unintended—is so full of holes that it cannot be taken seriously.

Judge Posner writes:

Because homosexuality is not a voluntary condition and homosexuals are among the most stigmatized, misunderstood, and discriminated-against minorities in the history of the world, the disparagement of their sexual orientation, implicit in the denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples, is a source of continuing pain to the homosexual community.

He carefully considers the argument put forward by the states that marriage is restricted to one man and one woman to benefit children. Among the many ways this argument fails to hold water:

But then how to explain Indiana's decision to carve an exception to its prohibition against marriage of close relatives for first cousins 65 or older—a population guaranteed to be infertile because women can't conceive at that age? [Wisconsin also bans first cousins from marrying unless the woman is over 55 or where the couple presents a doctor's affidavit saying one of them is permanently infertile.] If the state's only interest in allowing marriage is to protect children, why has it gone out of its way to permit marriage of first cousins only after they are provably infertile? ... Elderly first cousins are permitted to marry because they can't produce children; homosexuals are forbidden to marry because they can't produce children. The state's argument that a marriage of first cousins who are past child-bearing age provides a "model [of] family life for younger, potentially procreative men and women" is impossible to take seriously.

With regard to the commonly heard refrain, echoed by attorneys for Indiana and Wisconsin, that courts should respect democratically-enacted bans on marriage by same-sex couples, Judge Posner points out what should be obvious to anyone who claims fealty to the United States Constitution:

Minorities trampled on by the democratic process have recourse to the courts; the recourse is called constitutional law.

Courts exist to enforce the Constitution against those who would subvert it. And that drives the right crazy.

PFAW Foundation